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1.  Introduction.  
 Most environmental problems – e.g., SOx and NOx emissions from coal-burning power 
plants – are amenable to standard cost-benefit analysis.  There will be uncertainties over the costs 
and benefits of any candidate abatement policy, but the characteristics and extent of those 
uncertainties will usually be well-understood, and comparable in nature to the uncertainties 
involved in many other public and private policy or investment decisions.  Of course economists 
can (and will) argue about the details of the analysis.  But at a basic level, we’re in well-charted 
territory, and we think we know what we’re doing.  If we come to the conclusion that a policy to 
reduce SOx emissions by some amount is warranted, that conclusion will be seen – at least by 
most economists – as defensible and reasonable. 
 Not so with climate change.  Climate policy poses a serious dilemma for environmental 
economists.  Partly because of declining economic growth and rising unemployment in much of 
the world, there is waning political enthusiasm for implementing stringent greenhouse gas 
(GHG) abatement policies, and climate change is taking a back seat to other environmental – and 
non-environmental – policy problems.  More importantly, the economic argument for stringent 
GHG abatement is far from clear.  There is disagreement among both climate scientists and 
economists over the likelihood of alternative climate outcomes, as well as the nature and extent 
of the uncertainty over those outcomes.  There is also disagreement over the framework that 
should be used to evaluate the potential benefits from an abatement policy, including the social 
welfare function and the discount rate to be used to put future welfare benefits from abatement in 
present value terms.  These disagreements make climate policy difficult to evaluate, and a hard 
sell for the public at large.  
 Given these disagreements and the limits to our current state of knowledge, should 
climate policy be a priority for environmental economists and policy makers?  While many 
economists would support gradual GHG abatement, is there a case to be made for the early 
adoption of a stringent GHG abatement policy that would sharply reduce emissions and thereby 
limit the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, at an annual cost of more than 2% or 3% of 
GDP?  Put simply, is there a good economic argument for a stringent policy that is likely to be 
costly to implement and that would yield highly uncertain benefits only 50 or 100 years from 
now?  This is what I call the climate policy dilemma. 
 Why is it so difficult to apply standard cost-benefit analysis to a GHG abatement policy?  
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Compared to most other policy problems, the analysis is more complicated because of the very 
long time horizon involved, the very large uncertainties, and the difficulty of even characterizing 
those uncertainties.  Even if there were no uncertainty, the time horizon by itself creates a 
problem by making the present value of future benefits extremely sensitive to the choice of 
discount rate – and there is considerable disagreement over what the “correct” discount rate 
should be.  As for the uncertainties, they pertain to the extent of warming (and other aspects of 
climate change) under current and expected future GHG emissions, as well as the economic 
impact of any climate change that might occur.  The impact of climate change is especially 
uncertain, in part because of the possibility of adaptation.  We simply don’t know much about 
how worse off the world would be if by the end of the century the global mean temperature 
increased by 3° or 5°C.  In fact, we may never be able to resolve these uncertainties (at least not 
over the next 50 years).  It may be that the impact of higher temperatures is not just unknown, 
but also unknowable.  
 Over the last 20 years we have seen a proliferation of quantitative studies of climate 
policy, including a variety of integrated assessment models (IAMs), both large and small.1  What 
conclusions can we draw from this large (and still growing) body of research?  At the risk (or 
intent) of being provocative, I will argue that the case for a stringent GHG abatement policy 
cannot be based on “most likely” scenarios, i.e., climate and impact outcomes that are within our 
90 or even 95% confidence range.  Indeed, average estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC) 
based on three widely cited IAMs range (based on the assumed discount rate) from $5 to $35 per 
ton in 2010, rising to $16 to $65 per ton in 2050 – values consistent with at most moderate 
abatement.  Making the case for a stringent policy would require assumptions about costs, 
benefits and economic parameters that are far outside the consensus range.2   
                                                 
1 Such models “integrate” a description of GHG emissions and their impact on temperature and other aspects of 
climate (a climate science model) with projections of current and future abatement costs and a description of how 
changes in climate affect output, consumption, and other economic variables (an economic model). F 
2 For a survey of SCC estimates, see Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2011) and the Interagency Working Group 
(2010).  Those SCC estimates were generate from three IAMS – DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy), 
PAGE (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect), and FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty,  Distribution, 
and Negotiation).  The models are described in Nordhaus (2008) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Hope (2006), and 
Tol (2002) respectively.  The Stern Review (2007), which argues for the immediate adoption of very stringent GHG 
abatement, is an exception, but as Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007), Mendelsohn (2008) and others point out, the 
Stern analysis makes extreme assumptions about costs, benefits, and economic parameters. 
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If one accepts this point of view, then the question becomes whether an argument for 
stringent abatement might be based on the tail of the outcome distribution, i.e., based on the 
possibility of a catastrophic climate outcome.  The kind of outcome I am referring to is not 
simply a very large increase in temperature (or change in other climate indicia), but rather a very 
large impact, in terms of a decline in human welfare, from whatever climate change occurs.  If 
the likelihood and impact of such an outcome were sufficiently large, a net present value 
calculation might support a stringent policy.  But addressing this question is not so simple.  First, 
it may be that we can lay out possible catastrophic climate outcomes, but have little basis for 
assigning probabilities and/or a range of potential impacts.  Second, once we consider the 
possibility of a catastrophe, we must also consider other potential catastrophes that could 
seriously threaten human welfare, and thus might be deserving of their own policy responses.  
Given that a maximum of 100% of GDP can be devoted to catastrophe prevention, the existence 
of other potential catastrophes affects the economics of policies targeting a climate catastrophe.  
In the next section I discuss some of the uncertainties and areas of disagreement that 
complicate the evaluation of climate policy, including the framework for evaluating social 
welfare and key parameters.  I then turn to the nature and extent of the inherent uncertainties – 
over temperature and other climate outcomes, and over the economic impact of those outcomes.  
Using a “willingness to pay” (WTP) framework, I show that alternative distributions for 
temperature (including fat-tailed distributions) do not provide much guidance for policy.  I also 
explain that the key uncertainty is over economic impact, about which we know very little, and 
which may, in fact, be in the realm of the “unknowable.”  In Section 4, I argue that the economic 
case for a stringent GHG abatement policy, if it is to be made at all, must be based on the 
possibility of a catastrophic outcome, and I discuss how an analysis that incorporates such 
outcomes might be conducted.   
  
2.  The Economic Evaluation of Climate Policy. 
 The standard economic approach to policy evaluation is to apply a net present value 
(NPV) calculation to the current and expected future costs and benefits for the policy.  In the 
case of climate policy, this typically involves five steps.  First, projections are needed for future 
emissions of CO2 and other GHGs under a “business as usual” (BAU) and one or more 
abatement scenarios, along with estimates of resulting atmospheric GHG concentrations.  
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Second, these atmospheric GHG concentrations must be translated into global or regional 
temperature changes, along with other indicia of climate change.  The third step involves 
economics – projecting the lost GDP and consumption (along with other measures of social 
welfare) likely to result from higher temperatures and other climate changes.  Fourth, estimates 
are needed of the costs of abating GHG emissions by various amounts, i.e., the costs of the 
policy itself.  Lastly, some assumptions about social utility and the social rate of time preference 
are needed so that lost GDP and consumption at different points in time can be translated into 
losses of social welfare, and so that these losses of social welfare (along with ongoing costs of a 
policy) can be put in present value terms.   
These five steps are the essence of what makes up an integrated assessment model, and 
any IAM-based analysis of climate policy.  What is important is that each of these five steps 
involves considerable amounts of uncertainty, disagreement among economists and climate 
scientists about the nature and extent of the uncertainties, and disagreement about the 
measurement of social welfare and the key behavioral or policy parameters that affect welfare.  
Given the vast amount of research that has been done by economists and climate scientists on 
each of these elements, why has it been so hard to reach a consensus, and what does the lack of 
consensus imply for climate policy?   
 
2.1. The Discount Rate. 
 The disagreement and debate over the correct rate at which to discount the future benefits 
from GHG abatement is a good place to start to understand the climate policy dilemma.  To keep 
things simple, let’s assume that everyone agrees (even though they don’t) that the damage from 
global warming and climate change generally occurs via a reduction in consumption, C, and that 
a reduction in C directly reduces social welfare via the widely used constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function U(C):  
 1
1
( )
1
U C C 



 (1)  
Here η is the index of relative risk aversion, which is also a measure of social aversion to 
consumption inequality across points in time.  (The value of an extra unit of consumption, i.e., 
marginal utility, is '( )U C C  , which declines as C grows.) 
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 Now the question is how should we value the utility from some level of consumption 50 
years from now relative to the same amount of utility enjoyed today?  In other words, how should 
we discount future utility (not future consumption itself) so as to determine its present value?  
The discount rate used to do this, which I will denote by δ, is called the pure rate of time 
preference, but since we are looking at welfare for society as a whole, we will call it the social 
rate of time preference.  What is the “correct” value for this discount rate?   
 We know from a broad range of studies that most individuals would prefer to receive a 
unit of consumption now rather than receive that same unit a month, a year, or 10 years from 
now.  We also know that financial data reflecting investor behavior, as well as movements of 
macroeconomic aggregates reflecting consumer and firm behavior, suggest that δ is in the range 
of 2 to 5 percent.3  While a rate in this range might reflect the preferences of investors and 
consumers, should it also reflect intergenerational preferences and thus apply to time horizons of 
50 or 100 years?  In other words, should the welfare of our great-grandchildren be discounted 
relative to our own welfare, and if so, at what rate?  The answer to this question is crucial for 
climate policy: a rate of even 2 percent would make the present value of future welfare gains 
from GHG abatement too small relative to the costs of abatement to justify almost any policy.  
 Unfortunately, economics has little to say about how we should make such 
intergenerational comparisons.  Some economists (e.g., Stern (2007) and Heal (2009)) have 
argued that on ethical grounds the rate of time preference should be zero for such comparisons, 
i.e., that it is unethical to discount the welfare of future generations relative to our own.  But why 
is it unethical?  Suppose John and Jane both have the same incomes.  John saves 10 percent of 
his income every year in order to help finance the college educations of his (perhaps yet-to-be-
born) grandchildren, while Jane prefers to spend all of her disposable income on sports cars, 
boats, and expensive wines.  Does John’s concern for his grandchildren make him more ethical 
than Jane?  I don’t think economists have much to say about that question. 
 It seems to me that the rate of time preference is a policy parameter, i.e., it simply 
reflects the values of policy makers, who might or might not believe that their policy decisions 
reflect the values of voters.  As a policy parameter, the rate of time preference might be positive, 
zero, or even negative.  (One could argue, perhaps based on simple altruism, that the welfare of 
                                                 
3 For an excellent survey of research on the rate of time preference, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 
(2002). 
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our great-grandchildren should be valued more highly than our own.)  The problem is that once 
we agree that the rate of time preference is somewhat of an arbitrary parameter, it becomes hard 
to make a clear case for (or against) a stringent climate policy.  Put another way, as in other areas 
of economic policy, the case for a stringent climate policy should be reasonably robust, and not 
rely heavily on the value of a particular parameter (in this case the rate of time preference). 
 
2.2. The Index of Relative Risk Aversion (IRRA). 
 The IRRA, denoted by η, can also strongly affect the economic case for a climate policy.  
To see this, note that η affects expected future welfare in two ways.  First, the larger is η, the 
faster the marginal utility of consumption will decline as consumption grows.  Since (other 
things equal) consumption is expected to grow over time, the value of additional consumption in 
the future is smaller the larger is η. Second, η measures risk aversion; if future consumption is 
uncertain, future welfare will be smaller the larger is η.  Thus a higher value of η has two 
opposing effects on the expected benefits from an abatement policy that reduces climate-induced 
losses of future consumption: (1) a smaller marginal utility of consumption in the future, 
implying a smaller benefit from avoiding the climate-induced loss of consumption; and to the 
extent that there is uncertainty over the impact of GHG accumulation, (2) a larger loss of 
expected future welfare because of risk aversion, implying a larger benefit.  Unless risk aversion 
is extreme (e.g., η is above 4), the first effect will dominate, so that an increase in η (say from 1 
to 4) will reduce the benefits from an abatement policy. 
 Then what is the “correct” value for η that should be used when evaluating a climate 
policy?  Economists disagree.  The answer depends in part on whether we view η as a behavioral 
parameter (i.e., reflecting the behavior of consumers, investors, and firms) or a policy parameter 
(i.e., reflecting the opinions and objectives of policy makers).  As a behavioral parameter, the 
consensus range, based on the macroeconomics and finance literatures, extends from about 1.5 to 
at least 4.  As a policy parameter, we can consider the fact that η also reflects aversion to 
consumption inequality (in this case across generations).  If a future generation is expected to 
have twice the income and consumption as the current generation, then the marginal utility of 
consumption for the future generation is 1/2η as large as for the current generation, and would be 
weighted accordingly in any welfare calculation.  Since values of η above 3 or 4 imply a 
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relatively very small weight for the future generation, a policy maker might view smaller values 
of η as more appropriate.  In that case, the reasonable range might be from about 1 to 3.4  
 Whether we view η as a behavioral or policy parameter, we are left with a wide range of 
reasonable values, and thus a wide range of estimates of the benefits of climate change 
mitigation.  It is much harder to justify a costly climate policy if one believes that η is closer to 3 
than to 1, but at the same time it is hard to make a clear case that η should be close to 1.  As with 
the rate of time preference, our inability to pin down this crucial parameter makes it very 
difficult to argue clearly for (or against) a stringent climate policy. 
 
2.3. Estimates of Willingness to Pay. 
   It simplifies matters somewhat to focus on the “demand” side of climate policy, and ask 
what sacrifice society should be willing to make to achieve a policy objective.  For example, we 
could ask what is the largest fraction of consumption that society should be willing to give up, 
now and throughout the future, to prevent the global mean temperature from increasing by more 
than, say, 3°C by the end of the century.  Denote the increase in temperature by T, and suppose 
the willingness to pay (WTP) to ensure that 3T  C is 2% of consumption.  It may or may not 
be feasible to limit the temperature increase to 3°C at a cost of 2% of consumption; the cost 
might be less than 2% of consumption (in which case the policy would yield a positive social 
surplus) or it might be more than 2% (in which case the policy could not be justified 
economically).  The 2% is simply society’s reservation price for the policy objective.   
 The advantage of focusing on WTP is that we can ignore the cost side of policy, and 
focus on the uncertainties involved in projecting temperature increases and their impact on GDP 
and consumption, as well as the implications of alternative values of the rate of time preference 
and the index of relative risk aversion.  Suppose the policy objective is to reduce GHG emissions 
sufficiently that any increase in the global mean temperature by the year 2100 is at most 3°C.  
Climate science studies surveyed by the IPCC (2007) suggest that the expected temperature 
increase in 2100 under business as usual (BAU) is 3°C, so this seems like a reasonable 
objective.5  To make the case for a stringent abatement policy, we would want to show that the 
                                                 
4 For discussions of this point, see Dasgupta (2008) and Nordhaus (2011). 
5 This 3°C number is actually the expected value of climate sensitivity according to the IPCC (2007).  Climate 
sensitivity is the temperature increase that would result from a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of CO2-
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WTP for this objective is substantial, i.e., at least 2 or 3% of GDP, and is robust to a range of 
reasonable values for key parameters and to a range of reasonable probability distributions for 
the increase in temperature and for its impact. 
 I used this approach in a study of climate change policy that examined the implications of 
uncertainty over both temperature change and its impact on the growth rate of GDP.6  Using 
information on distributions for temperature change and economic impact from studies 
assembled by the IPCC and others, I fit displaced gamma distributions for these variables, which 
I argued roughly reflect the “state of knowledge” regarding the nature and extent of uncertainty 
over warming and its impact. Using these distributions, I calculated the WTP to limit the 
increase in temperature by the end of the century to 3°C.  I found that for just about any values of 
η between 1 and 4, that WTP was less than 2% of GDP if the rate of time preference, δ, was 1% 
or greater.  Setting δ to zero (the so-called “ethical” value), a WTP greater than 2% could only be 
obtained if η was less than 1.5.  For values of η above 2, the WTP was less than 1%.  These 
results are inconsistent with the immediate adoption of a stringent abatement policy. 
     Of course one might argue with the particular distributions I used (or the studies surveyed by 
the IPCC to which those distributions are calibrated), and with the range of parameters I 
considered.  Stern, for example, set η = 1, the lowest end of the credible range.  Research by 
climate scientists and economists may yield distributions for temperature change and its impact 
that are more pessimistic than those I (and others) have used, and might lead us to conclude that 
the “correct” distributions should have more weight in the tails.  I turn to that possibility next.   
 
3.  The Nature of Climate Change Uncertainty. 
 There are two key areas of uncertainty, and thus two distributions that we need to worry 
about – the extent of warming, and the economic impact from whatever warming occurs.7  Much 
                                                                                                                                                             
equivalent (CO2e).  But given the IPCC’s estimated trajectory for atmospheric CO2e and the time it takes for higher 
temperatures to result, 3°C is, at least roughly, the expected value of the temperature increase. 
6 See Pindyck (2012).  Most IAMs and other economic studies of climate change posit a direct relationship between 
higher temperatures and the level of GDP, whereas (on theoretical and empirical grounds) I related higher 
temperatures to the growth rate of GDP.  In Pindyck (2011b), I examined the extent to which my results might have 
been affected by relating temperature increases to the growth rate as opposed to the level of GDP, and found that it 
made little difference in the resulting estimates of WTP.  For other studies using WTP, see, e.g., Heal and Kriström 
(2002) and Newbold and Daigneault (2010). 
7 I am assuming that all impacts of climate change, including health and social impacts, can be monetized and 
expressed in terms of lost GDP. 
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of the discussion of uncertainty that has appeared in the literature has been in reference to the 
extent of warming and related climate changes.  I believe the main reason for this discrepancy is 
that we know much more about the climate science than we do about economic impacts.  Thus 
we can look at means or confidence intervals that climate scientists have arrived at for, say, 
temperature, and then consider the probability distributions that are consistent with those 
statistics.  The treatment of economic impact in most IAMs is largely ad hoc; a loss function L(T) 
is specified such that L(0) = 1 and L(T) declines as T increases, and the parameters of that loss 
function are chosen to yield moderate losses (e.g., 3% of GDP, so L = .97) from moderate values 
of T, e.g., 3° or 4°C.8  But there is little evidence on which to base the choice of parameters for 
the loss function, apart from yielding numbers (e.g., L(3) = .97) that seem “reasonable.”  
Furthermore, once we consider temperatures of 6°C and higher, determining the economic loss, 
or a distribution for that loss, become a matter of guesswork.  One can plug high temperatures 
into IAM loss functions – see Figure 1 in Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2011) for an 
illustration – but the results are just extrapolations with no empirical or theoretical grounding. 
 Given our inability to even characterize the uncertainty over economic impact, I will 
focus in this section on uncertainty over T:  If we do little or nothing to abate GHG emissions, 
how much might the temperature increase by 2100?  To address this question, we would like to 
know what probability distribution best represents the likelihood of various outcomes for T.  In 
summarizing 22 studies of climate sensitivity, the IPCC (2007) translated the implied 
distributions into a standardized form, and created graphs showing multiple distributions implied 
by groups of studies.  I found that a displaced gamma distribution for T provided a good fit to 
these distributions, and in Pindyck (2011b, 2012), I calibrated the parameters of the gamma 
distribution to match the mean and critical 66% and 95% points from the IPCC summary.  Using 
the calibrated distribution, I then calculated the WTP to keep T in the year 2100 at or below 
various levels, and obtained values for WTP that were generally small.9  
                                                 
8 The Nordhaus (2008) DICE model uses the inverse-quadratic loss function 2
1 2( ) 1/ (1 )L T T T    .  Weitzman 
(2008) introduced the exponential-quadratic loss function, L(T) = exp(−βT2), which allows for greater losses at high 
temperatures.   
9 Given a value for T2100, the temperature increase at each point in time, Tt, increases from zero to this value and then 
continues increasing, asymptotically approaching 2T2100.  To be precise, the temperature change at time t is
.01
21002 [1 (1/ 2) ]
t
tT T  .  See Pindyck (2012) for details. 
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 A natural critique of this earlier work is that the distribution I used for T is overly 
optimistic.  Some recent work suggests that the expected value for T is greater than 3°C, and/or 
that the 95% point should be at a higher temperature than the 7°C that I used.  Recalibrating the 
distribution to a mean of 5°C indeed increases the WTP – I obtained a WTP above 3% if δ = 0 
and η is below 1.5.  But this is hardly robust evidence for a high WTP; if δ = .01 and/or η is 
above 1.5, the WTP again fall below 2%    
 Another possible critique is that the gamma distribution is thin-tailed, and I should have 
used a fat-tailed distribution.10  This is the argument raised by Weitzman (2009, 2011) as a 
potential justification for stringent abatement.  In Pindyck (2011a), I showed that a fat-tailed 
distribution by itself need not lead to larger WTP if marginal utility is bounded.11  Nonetheless, 
one could argue that alternative distributions for T that are also consistent with the IPCC (2007) 
mean and critical points, whether fat- or thin-tailed, might result in higher values of WTP.  I 
explore this possibility below.   
 
3.1.  Alternative Distributions for Temperature. 
 Figure 1 shows the gamma distribution I used in Pindyck (2011b, 2012), for temperatures 
up to 10°C, with parameters calibrated to match the mean and critical 66% and 95% points from 
the IPCC summary of climate sensitivity studies.12  This distribution implies a 2.9% probability 
of a temperature decline as large as 1.1°C, which is consistent with the studies surveyed by the 
IPCC.  In addition to an expected temperature change of 3°C, it implies a standard deviation of 
2.1°C for the temperature change.  Note that this distribution (as well as the distributions 
discussed below) applies to the temperature increase as of 2100.    
 Figure 1 also shows two other distributions for T – a Frechet (also called a Generalized 
Extreme Value, Type 2) distribution, and a distribution labeled Roe-Baker.  This last one (not a 
                                                 
10 A thin-tailed (fat-tailed) distribution for T declines to zero faster (more slowly) than exponentially as T increases. 
11 Eqn. (1) implies that marginal utility become infinite as consumption goes to zero.  As a result, a fat-tailed 
distribution for T can yield a WTP of 100% because the high probability of a sufficiently high T and resulting high 
probability of a sufficiently low C can imply an expected marginal utility of consumption that is infinite.  This result 
disappears if we bound marginal utility at some maximum value. 
12 The distribution is 
 
1 ( )( ; , , ) ( ) ,
( )
r
r Tf T r T e T
r
        

  
where Γ(r) is the gamma function, r = 3.8, λ = 0.92, and θ = −1.13. 
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standard probability distribution) was developed by Roe and Baker (2007) from a simple climate 
model with uncertain feedback effects.  I chose parameter values for these two distributions to 
match the mean, standard deviation, and minimum point of the gamma distribution.13  (It appears 
from the graph that the Frechet and Roe-Baker distributions begin at values of T above 0, but in 
fact the distributions are positive, but extremely small, for values of T as low as −1°.)  The 
Frechet distribution is “somewhat” fat-tailed; for the parameter values I have chosen, the 
distribution has a mean and variance but no higher moments.  The Roe-Baker distribution is 
extremely fat-tailed; none of the moments exist.  (I calibrated the Roe-Baker distribution to have 
a calculated mean of 3° and standard deviation of 2.1° for range of T up to 50°.) 
 All three of these distributions seem like credible descriptions of the likelihood of future 
temperature realizations, especially since we know very little about the likelihood of 
temperatures above 6 or 8°C.  Depending on one’s priors, one distribution might seem more 
credible than others; the Frechet and Roe-Baker distributions, for example, have much more 
mass between 1° and 4° than does the gamma distribution, and the Roe-Baker distribution has a 
theoretical grounding.  But note from Figure 2 that the tails of these distributions look quite 
different.  Compared to the gamma distribution, the Frechet and Roe-Baker distributions have 
much more mass at temperatures above 10°.  But again, given how little we know about the 
likelihood of such high temperatures, it is hard to distinguish among these distributions and 
claim that one is more “correct” than the others. 
 
3.2  Implications for Policy. 
 Might these three temperature distributions have very different policy implications?  I 
address this using the framework in Pindyck (2012), but taking the parameter that relates T to the 
                                                 
13 The Frechet distribution is given by 
1/ 1 1/( ; , , ) (1/ )exp[ (1 ) ](1 )k kf T k kz kz           
where z = (T − µ)/σ, k > 0, and T ≥ µ − σ/k.  The parameter values are k = 0.28, µ = 2.15, and σ = 0.915.  The Roe-
Baker distribution is given by 
 
2
2
1 1 1 1/
( ; , , ) exp
22
f
ff
f z
g T f
z
 
 
   
        
  
where z = T + θ.  The parameters values are 0.797f  , σf = .0441, and θ = 2.13.  The feedback parameter in the 
model is normally distributed with mean and standard deviation f and σf respectively. 
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rate of GDP growth as fixed and equal to its mean value.14  This implies, consistent with IPCC 
(2007), a 3% loss of GDP in 2100 if T reaches 4°C. For each of the three temperature 
distributions, and for a range of values for the index of risk aversion, η, I calculate the WTP to 
ensure that T in 2100 will not exceed its mean value of 3°C.  The results are shown in Figure 3. 
 Observe that the highest values of WTP are obtained when T is assumed to follow the 
(thin-tailed) gamma distribution.  The Roe-Baker distribution, which is extremely fat-tailed, 
leads to a very low WTP for the entire range of η.  The reason is evident from Figures 1 and 2.  
Compared to the gamma distribution, the Roe-Baker and Frechet distributions are “bunched up” 
in the range of 1° to 4°, with less mass in the moderately high temperature range of 5° to 8°.  The 
standard deviations are the same because they have more mass at very high temperatures, but the 
probabilities for those very high temperatures are still very low.  Thus fat tails need not imply a 
high WTP (a point discussed in detail in Pindyck (2011a)). 
 It may be that the limited set of economic studies reviewed by the IPCC (2007) were 
overly optimistic regarding the impact of higher temperatures.  To explore this, I recalculated 
WTP, but this time doubling the parameter that relates T to the rate of GDP growth (so that T = 
4°C would result in a 6% loss of GDP in 2100).  The results are shown in Figure 4.  Not 
surprisingly, the WTP numbers are roughly double those in Figure 3.  In fact for the gamma 
distribution, WTP is close to 10% of GDP if the index of risk aversion, η, is close to 1. 
 What do the results in Figure 4 tell us?  First, if we posit a large enough economic 
impact, for the right parameter values (and probability distribution for temperature) we can 
obtain a WTP that is large enough to be consistent with stringent abatement.  But note that the 
parameter values needed to get this result are a bit extreme; a value of η below 1.5 and a rate of 
time preference, δ, equal to zero.  (Although not shown in the figures, WTP falls dramatically if 
δ = .01 or .02.)  This is hardly a robust case for stringent abatement. 
 Perhaps we need to consider the possibility of even larger economic impacts, especially 
for temperature increases above 5°C, which, though unlikely, are certainly possible.  The 
problem is that we know so little about the possible economic impacts of global warming.  
Unlike with temperature itself, it is difficult to even come up with probability distributions.   
 
                                                 
14 In Pindyck (2012), the real per capita GDP growth rate is gt = g0 – γTt, where γ is uncertain and follows a gamma 
distribution.  In this exercise I focus on uncertainty over T and set γ equal to its mean value. 
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3.3  Impact of Climate Change: The Unknown and the Unknowable. 
 Why is it so difficult to estimate how climate change will affect the economy?  One 
problem is that we have very little data on which to base empirical work.  True, there have been 
a few empirical studies that made use of temperature and rainfall data for a large panel of 
countries over 50 or more years.15  Those studies have helped to confirm that the impact of 
higher temperatures is largely on the growth rate of GDP, as opposed to the level of GDP.  But 
the size of the impact is imprecisely measured, and only applies to small changes in temperature, 
not the 5° or more of warming that many worry about.  The same is true for studies of the effects 
of temperature on agricultural output. 
 Second, there is little or nothing in the way of economic theory that could help us 
understand the potential impact of higher temperatures.  We have some sense of how higher 
temperatures might affect agriculture, but we also know that losses of agricultural output in some 
regions of the world (e.g., near the Equator) might be matched by increased out in other regions 
(e.g., northern Canada and Russia).  Furthermore, agriculture is a small fraction of total 
economic output (1 to 2% of GDP for industrialized countries, 3 to 20% of GDP for developing 
countries).  Beyond agriculture, it is difficult even at a heuristic level to explain how higher 
temperatures will affect economic activity.  That is why the loss functions that relate temperature 
to GDP in IAMs are generally ad hoc.  
 Third, climate change will occur slowly, so that there is considerable potential for 
adaptation.  In the case of agriculture, we have already seen this in the U.S. during the 19th 
century as settlers moved west and had to adapt crops to new and very different climatic 
conditions.  (The recent book edited by Libecap and Steckel (2011) provides several detailed 
examples of this kind of adaptation.)  Flooding is a potential hazard of climate change if sea 
levels rise substantially, but here, too, we have seen adaptation in the past (with the dikes of 
Holland perhaps the best-known example). This does not mean, however, that adaptation will 
eliminate the impact of climate change – it is simply another complicating factor that makes it 
very difficult to estimate any kind of loss function.  
 It may be that the relationship between temperature and the economy is not just 
something we don’t know, but something that we cannot know, at least for the time horizon 
                                                 
15 See Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008, 2009), and Bansal and Ochoa (2011a, b).   
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relevant to the design and evaluation of climate policy.  Some researchers have come to the 
conclusion that climate sensitivity is in this category of the “unknowable.”16  Yet, for the reasons 
given above, the impact of climate change is far less “knowable” than climate sensitivity.   If so, 
then we will never (or at least over any relevant time period) reach a consensus on the question 
posed at the beginning of this paper: Should environmental economists push for the early 
adoption of a stringent GHG abatement policy?  
 Note that this does not mean the answer to this question is no, and that there is no case to 
be made for stringent GHG abatement.  But I don’t think the case can be made by applying 
Monte Carlo simulation methods to one or more integrated assessment models, or by calculating 
WTP based on “consensus” probability distributions as I have done earlier.  The case would have 
to be based on the possibility of a catastrophic outcome, something that is far outside the realm 
of these models and probability distributions. 
 
4.  Catastrophic Climate Change. 
 For some environmentalists, without stringent abatement, a climate catastrophe is not just 
a possibility, but almost a sure thing.  In a recent New York Times opinion piece, for example, 
James Hansen (2012) claims that if Canada extracts the oil from its reserves of tar sands “and we 
do nothing, it will be game over for the climate.”  Exactly what is meant by “game over” is 
unclear, but it sounds catastrophic.  It is certainly not something embodied in any integrated 
assessment model I am aware of.  While a catastrophic climate outcome is indeed a possibility 
(with or without Canadian tar sands oil), it is something we know very little about. 
 Is there some way to bring economic analysis to bear on the policy implications of 
possible catastrophic outcomes?  For climate scientists, catastrophic outcomes almost always 
take the form of high temperature outcomes, e.g., a 7° or 8° increase by 2100.  Putting aside the 
difficulty of estimating the probability of such a large temperature increase, what matters in the 
end is not the temperature increase itself, but rather the impact it would have.  Would that impact 
be “catastrophic,” and if so, in what sense?  And might a smaller (and more likely) temperature 
increase also have a catastrophic impact?  
                                                 
16 See, for example, Allen and Frame (2007), who show how the uncertain feedback effects that are central to the 
Roe-Baker model imply that we will never be able to determine an upper bound for climate sensitivity. 
 15 
 My calculations of WTP in the preceding section were based on full distributions of 
temperature outcomes, but for all three of the distributions I considered, the probabilities for very 
high temperatures are low.  However, we saw in Figure 4 that by doubling the assumed impact of 
temperature on GDP growth, we obtained a higher WTP.  This is no surprise; we could increase 
the impact even more (e.g., so 4° of warming would result in a 12% loss of GDP in 2100), and 
get a still higher WTP.  The problem, as explained above, is that we have very little basis – 
empirical or theoretical – for determining the actual impact, or even the overall functional 
relationship between temperature and GDP or GDP growth.   
 Furthermore, it is difficult to see how our knowledge of the economic impact of rising 
temperatures is likely to improve in the coming years.  Even more so than temperature change 
itself, economic impact may simply be in the realm of the “unknowable.”  If so, it would make 
little sense to try to use an IAM-based analysis to make the case for stringent abatement.  That 
case would have to be based on the likelihood – even if it is small – of a catastrophic outcome in 
which climate change is sufficiently extreme to cause a very substantial drop in welfare.  
 
4.1. How Likely?  How Extreme?  
How should we think about catastrophic climate outcomes?  Given how little we know, it 
seems to me that a very detailed and complex modeling exercise is unlikely to be helpful.  (Even 
if we really believed the model accurately represented the relevant physical and economic 
relationships, which is unlikely, we would have to come to agreement on key parameters, such as 
the rate of time preference.)  Probably something simpler is needed – although not so simple as 
the type of claims made by Hansen (2012) and others that a catastrophe is inevitable.  Perhaps 
the best we can do is come up with rough, subjective estimates of the probability of a climate 
change sufficiently large to have a catastrophic impact, and then some distribution for the size of 
that impact (in terms, say, of a reduction in GDP, or a reduction in the effective capital stock or 
the productivity of the capital stock).  
This is the approach that has been use in recent studies of “consumption disasters,” 
defined as events that caused consumption to decline by some substantial amount (say, more 
than 10%).  In much of that work, disasters are modeled as Poisson arrivals, the impact of which 
is a random percentage reduction in the capital stock (and thus in ongoing consumption), with 
the loss fraction given by a simple distribution such as a one-parameter power distribution.  The 
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mean Poisson arrival rate and the parameter of the impact distribution might be estimated from 
consumption data for a sample of countries over a century or more of time, or inferred from the 
behavior of macroeconomic and financial aggregates.17  For climate change, however, a 
catastrophic outcome has not yet occurred, so estimating impact parameters from panel data or 
from macroeconomic aggregates is not an option.18  
The problem is analogous to assessing the world’s greatest catastrophic risk during the 
Cold War – the possibility of a thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  
What was the likelihood of such an event?  There were no data or reliable models that could 
yield good estimates.  Instead, analyses had to be based on the plausible, i.e., on events that 
could reasonably be expected to play out, even if with low probability.  The same approach had 
to be taken with respect to assessing the range of potential impacts of a thermonuclear exchange.  
Such analyses were useful because they helped evaluate the potential benefits (and risks) of arms 
control agreements. 
It seems to me that the same approach can be used to assess climate change catastrophes.  
We could begin by asking what is a plausible range of catastrophic outcomes (under, for 
example, BAU), as measured by a percentage declines in the stock of productive capital (thereby 
reducing future GDP over time).  That range could be discrete (e.g., three or more potential 
outcomes) or continuous.  Next, what are plausible probabilities?  Here, “plausible” would mean 
acceptable to a range of economists and climate scientists.  Given these plausible outcomes and 
probabilities, one can calculate the WTP to avert those outcomes, or to reduce the probabilities 
of their occurrence.  That WTP will once again depend on preference parameters, i.e., the rate of 
time preference and index of risk aversion.  But if the WTP is robust to reasonable ranges for 
those parameters, it might provide support for a stringent policy.   
This approach does not carry the perceived precision that is part of an IAM-based 
analysis.  But that perceived precision is likely to be illusory.  To the extent that we are dealing 
with unknowable quantities, it may be that the best we can do is rely on the “plausible.” 
 
                                                 
17 Barro (2009) and Barro and Jin (2009) are examples of studies in which arrival rates and impact distributions are 
estimated from panel data.  Pindyck and Wang (2012) estimate the relevant parameters (including the IRRA) as 
calibration outputs from a general equilibrium model. 
18 Although Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008, 2009), and Bansal and Ochoa (2011a, b) estimated the impact of 
temperature change on economic growth using historical data for a panel of countries, both the temperature 
variations and changes in growth rates were small and nothing close to what might considered “catastrophic.”  
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4.2. Multiple Potential Catastrophes. 
So suppose an analysis of climate change catastrophes based on “plausible” outcomes 
and probabilities indicates a high WTP, something around 10% of GDP, for a reasonable range 
of preference parameters.  Are we home yet?  Would we then have what we need to support a 
stringent abatement policy?   
Maybe not.  The problem is that we must consider other potential catastrophic events.  A 
climate catastrophe is only one of a number of potential catastrophes that could cause major 
damage on a global scale.  Different people have different nightmares, but my list would include 
a nuclear or biological terrorist attack (far worse than 9/11), a highly contagious “mega-virus” 
that spreads uncontrollably, or an environmental catastrophe unrelated to GHG emissions and 
climate change (perhaps related to toxic waste or severe water shortages).F19F  These other 
potential catastrophes may be just as likely, or even more likely, to occur than a climate 
catastrophe, and could occur much sooner and with much less warning (and thus less time to 
adapt).  And as with climate, the likelihood and/or impact of these catastrophes could be reduced 
by taking costly action now. 
The approach outlined above can also be used to assess other possible catastrophes.  An 
example is nuclear terrorism.  Various studies have assessed the likelihood and potential impact 
of the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons (with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb) in 
major cities.  “Plausible” estimates of the probability of this occurring in the next ten years vary.  
Allison (2004) puts the probability at 50%; others put it at 1 to 5%.  What are plausible estimates 
of the impact?  A million or more deaths, along with a shock to the capital stock and GDP 
resulting from reduced trade and economic activity worldwide, as vast resources are devoted to 
averting further events.  (For a discussion and survey, see Ackerman and Potter (2008).)  
Suppose the WTP to avert or reduce the probability of a nuclear catastrophe of this sort is 
10% of GDP.  How would this affect the analysis of a climate catastrophe?  Suppose that with no 
other potential catastrophes, the WTP to avoid a climate catastrophe is also 10% of GDP.  And 
suppose there are also five or six other potential catastrophes (a mega-virus, a severe water 
shortage, … come up with your own list), each with a WTP of 10%.  How will the WTP for 
averting a climate catastrophe change once we take into account the other potential catastrophes?  
                                                 
19 For those readers lacking imagination, see Posner (2004) and Bostrom and Ćirković (2008).  For a sobering 
discussion of the likelihood and possible impact of nuclear terrorism, see Allison (2004). 
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It is likely to go down, as will the individual WTPs for the other catastrophes.  The reason is that 
the WTPs are not additive; society would probably be unwilling to spend 60 or 70% of GDP to 
avert all of these catastrophes.20  Thus, when taken as a group, the WTP for each potential 
catastrophe (including climate) would fall.  
Unfortunately, society faces a number of potentially catastrophic threats, and opinions 
will differ as to how large that number is, and which threats are worse than others.  Climate 
change is probably one of those threats, but it is unclear where it would rank in a list that was 
ordered by likelihood and potential severity.  The point is that when evaluating the expenditure 
of scarce resources to reduce the likelihood of a climate catastrophe, these other catastrophic 
threats should not be ignored.   
5.  Conclusions. 
 I began by asking whether environmental economists should push for the early adoption 
of a stringent GHG abatement policy.  I have argued that the economic case for stringent GHG 
abatement cannot be made based on “most likely outcomes,” i.e., distributions for temperature 
change consistent with the IPCC (2007), and the economic impact functions used in most IAMs 
(and were also surveyed by the IPCC).  It doesn’t matter whether the temperature distributions 
are fat- or thin-tailed.  Even if we assume that moderate temperature change (say 4°C) would 
have a large economic impact (say a 6% loss of GDP), the willingness to pay for a stringent 
policy will be small for most “reasonable” values of key parameters.  For example, it is hard to 
justify even a moderate abatement policy if the rate of time preference is 1 or 2% rather than 
zero, or if the index of risk aversion is 2 or greater.  Some have argued that “ethics” should 
dictate these parameter values; a rate of time preference of zero might reflect the ethical values 
of some economists, but there is no evidence I am aware of that it reflects the preferences of 
society as a whole. 
                                                 
20 It is actually a bit more complicated.  The WTP for climate would be affected in two opposing ways.  On the one 
hand, the non-climate potential catastrophes reduce the expected growth rate of GDP, thereby reducing expected 
future GDP and increasing expected future marginal utility before a climate catastrophe occurs.  This in turn 
increases the benefit of avoiding the climate catastrophe.  On the other hand, assuming all of these potential 
catastrophes are equally threatening, a large fraction of GDP would be needed to keep us safe.  This “income effect” 
would reduce the WTP for climate.  Unless the number of potential catastrophes is small, this “income effect” will 
dominate, so that the WTP for climate will fall.   
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 I have also argued that the greatest area of uncertainty is with the economic impact of 
climate change.  (Again, “economic impact” includes health and social impacts.)  The economic 
loss functions that are part of most IAMs are essentially ad hoc.  This is not surprising given how 
little we know – in terms of both theory and data – about temperature and other climate variables 
affect the economy.  In fact, the economic impact of climate change may well be in the realm of 
the “unknowable.”  This in turn means that IAM-based analyses of climate change may not take 
us very far, and the models may be of very limited use as a policy tool.  
 These arguments imply that any case for stringent abatement must be based on the 
possibility of a catastrophic climate outcome.  And a “catastrophic climate outcome” does not 
simply mean a very high increase in temperature and rising sea levels; what matters is whether 
the economic impact of those physical changes would be catastrophic.  Furthermore, simply 
stating that such an outcome is possible is not enough.  We would need “plausible” estimates of 
probabilities of various temperature outcomes, and “plausible” estimates of large economic 
impacts from those temperature outcomes.  The claims of likely catastrophic outcomes that I 
have seen (made largely by climate scientists, not economists) relate to temperature and other 
physical processes (such as climate variability and changes in sea levels).  Usually absent is a 
clear analysis showing that the economic impact of these physical changes would be so large as 
to be catastrophic.  Completely absent (to my knowledge) is any analysis that puts a climate 
catastrophe in the context of a set of potential global catastrophes. 
 So should environmental economists push for stringent GHG abatement?  In the end, I 
have not answered that question.  Instead I have tried to explain why the question is so inherently 
difficult, why an answer won’t come from the kinds of modeling exercises that have permeated 
the literature, and why the case for stringent abatement – if that case is to be made at all – must 
be based on an analysis of potential catastrophic outcomes.     
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Figure 1: Three Temperature Distributions.  All three distributions were calibrated to have 
the same mean (3°), standard deviation (2.1°), and minimum possible temperature change 
(−1.1°). 
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Figure 2: Upper Tails of Temperature Distributions. 
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Figure 3:  WTP to Keep T in 2100 Below 3°C.  The three distributions (gamma, Frechet, and 
Roe-Baker) are calibrated to have the same mean (3°), standard deviation (2.1°), and minimum 
possible temperature change (−1.1°).  Initial GDP growth rate, g0, is .02, the rate of time 
preference, δ, is zero, and the growth impact parameter, γ, equals its mean value of .000136. 
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Figure 4:  WTP to Keep T in 2100 Below 3°C, with Growth Impact Doubled.  The three 
distributions have the same mean (3°), standard deviation (2.1°), and minimum possible 
temperature change (−1.1°).  Initial GDP growth rate, g0, is .02, and rate of time preference, δ, is 
zero.  The growth impact parameter, γ, equals twice its mean value, i.e., γ = .000272. 
 
